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TRADEMARK
Jessica R. Friedman
Two college students create an Internet site 154 under the domain
name "elektra.com."' 55 The site offers a computer bulletin board ser-
vice'5 6 called "Elektrabeat" directed towards composers of electronic
music. It also offers access to digital sound recordings that subscribers
can sample online and download to their personal computers upon
payment of a small fee. The students apply to the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office to obtain federal service mark'5 7 registra-
tions for both "Elektrabeat" and "elektra.com." Shortly after the
students begin to operate their service, the site comes to the attention
of Elektra Records. Elektra promptly demands that the students
cease and desist from using the name "Elektrabeat" and withdraw
both of their pending service mark applications. Elektra also de-
mands that the students relinquish their domain name "elektra.com"
and threatens to sue not only the students but also InterNIC, the
agency that assigns domain names. 58 This hypothetical scenario illus-
trates some of the ways in which trademarks may come into play on
the information superhighway.
Part I of this section of the Report outlines some basic principles of
trademark law. Part II discusses trademark issues that have arisen in
the context of modern information technologies, including the increas-
ing relationship between trademarks and Internet domain names.
I. TRADEMARK LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A trademark is a "word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof" used to indicate the source of goods to consumers. 159 A
service mark takes the same forms and serves the same purpose for
154. An "Internet site" is a "[h]ost computer [that] provid[esj Internet services."
MTW Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). This hypotheti-
cal assumes that the students would have the technical expertise to set up an Internet
site. Many people retain Internet consultants for this purpose. See G. Burgess Al-
lison, The Lawyer's Guide to the Internet 109 (1995).
155. A "domain name" is the "address" of an information service provider on the
Internet. See Curry, 867 F. Supp. at 204 n.2. The designation ".com" in the site name
indicates a commercial service, as opposed to, for example, ".edu," which designates
an educational institution, or ".gov," which designates a government entity. The
name immediately to the left of the ".com" designation identifies the host computer
and the entity that owns the site.
156. A bulletin board service is an online service that enables users to enter infor-
mation for others to read or copy. James A. O'Brien, Management Information Sys-
tems: A Managerial End User Perspective 646 (1990).
157. For a definition of "service mark," see infra note 160 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Examples of trademarks include "Levi's," "Nabisco,"
"Ford," and "Heinz." See Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., A Primer on Trademarks and Ser-
vice Marks, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 137, 139 (1986).
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intangible services. 160 Trademarks generally perform four functions.
They (1) "identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from the
goods sold by others," (2) indicate "that all goods [which bear] the
trademark come from or are controlled by a single, albeit anonymous,
source," (3) signify that all goods which bear the mark are of the same
quality, and (4) play a primary role in the advertising of the products
sold under the mark.16' The underlying purpose of trademark law is
to "protect the purchasing public from confusing the product it desires
to purchase with a similar product from a different source."" z
The owner of a valid mark has the exclusive right to use that
mark, 63 at least to the extent necessary to prevent consumer confu-
sion.16 For exclusive ownership to attach to a mark, certain condi-
tions must be fulfilled. First, the mark itself must be capable of
distinguishing the purported owner's goods or services. 16 Not every
word or phrase satisfies this requirement.'6 Second, the person or
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Examples of service marks include "Roto-
Rooter," "Allstate," and "Coldwell Banker." See Evans, supra note 159, at 139-40.
For the remainder of this section of the Report, the terms "trademarks" or "marks"
shall be used to refer to both trademarks and service marks.
161. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 3.0112], at 3-3 (3d ed. 1995).
162. Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Tital Technologies, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1143
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
163. ld.
164. 1 McCarthy, supra note 161, § 2.05[1], at 2-22 to 2-23.
165. See id. § 11.01, at 11-4 ("[A]U candidates for trademark status must be...
inherently distinctive or non-inherently distinctive.")
166. There are four traditional categories of marks. A "generic" term describes the
product or service itself, and thus is incapable of identifying a particular source of that
product or service. See Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d
1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1991). VIDEO BUYERS' GUIDE, for example, was held not
to be a valid trademark for a magazine because it identified a type of magazine. Reese
Publishing Co., v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11-12 (2d Cir.
1980).
A "descriptive" mark literally describes the purpose, end use, class of users, or
some other characteristic of the product or service, see 1 McCarthy, supra note 161,
§ 11.05[2][a], at 11-20 to 11-21, like HONEY ROAST for roasted nuts, id., § 11.08, at
11-34, and thus is incapable of identifying the source of the product or service, id.,
§ 11.05[3], at 11-23, unless it has been used so extensively that consumers have come
to identify that mark with its source. See hiL, § 11.09, at 11-40. In that case, the mark is
said to have acquired "secondary meaning." See id.; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 (1992). CHAPSTICK is a descriptive mark which has ac-
quired secondary meaning. Evans, supra note 159, at 151.
A "suggestive" mark, which requires some thought or imagination to ascertain the
subject or nature of the goods or services, is a valid trademark ab initio. 1 McCarthy,
supra note 161, § 11.20[1], at 11-104.4. ROACH MOTEL has been held to be a sug-
gestive mark for roach and waterbug traps. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson
Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978).
An "arbitrary" mark is a commonly used term which has no inherent relationship
to the goods or services that it serves to designate. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 161,
§ 11.04[1], at 11-14. An example of an arbitrary mark is BLACK & WHITE scotch
whiskey. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 154 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
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entity claiming exclusive ownership must have used the mark
commercially. 16
7
One who uses a mark owned by another in a manner that is likely to
cause confusion as to the source of goods or services is liable for
trademark infringement. 16 To establish a cause of action for trade-
mark infringement, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of a valid
mark and (2) a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's mark
and the defendant's mark.169 A federal certificate of trademark regis-
tration is prima facie evidence that the registrant is the exclusive
owner of the mark. 170 A likelihood of confusion exists if ordinary
consumers would reasonably believe that the defendant's goods or
services originate with the plaintiff or are associated with or sponsored
by the plaintiff.' 7 '
A fifth category which McCarthy identifies, but which is not always categorized
separately from arbitrary marks, is fanciful marks such as KODAK. 1 McCarthy,
supra note 161, § 11.03[4], at 11-13. McCarthy points out that if a fanciful mark is
used on a new product, consumers may use the mark as the name of the product itself,
which will result in the mark's becoming generic, as occurred with ASPIRIN and ES-
CALATOR. Id., § 11.03[5], at 11-14.
167. Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Tital Technologies, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1143
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines the use necessary to establish
ownership of a mark as "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade,
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). To obtain
federal trademark protection, use in interstate commerce is necessary. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a) (1994). It is possible to file an application for federal registration without
having used the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994). The registration, however, will
not issue until the applicant has shown the requisite use in interstate commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1994).
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994) (providing federal cause of action for infringe-
ment of registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994) (providing federal cause of
action for infringement of non-registered marks).
169. See Jockey Club, Inc. v. Jockey Club of Las Vegas, Inc., 595 F.2d 1167, 1168
(9th Cir. 1979); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp.
823, 834 (D.N.J. 1992).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994). Although use, not registration, actually creates
exclusive rights in a mark, and registration is not necessary to enforce those exclusive
rights, federal registration of a mark confers several advantages on the registrant in
addition to prima facie evidence of ownership. Registration serves as constructive
notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of a mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994). In
addition, the owner of a federal registration has the right to sue for infringement in
federal court without having to show a threshold amount in controversy or satisfy
other jurisdictional requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994). After five years, a
federal registration can become incontestable, precluding certain challenges to the
validity of the registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994). Lastly, the maximum damage
award in an infringement suit may be higher for a registered mark than for a non-
registered mark. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1994) (allowing treble damages and
reasonable attorney fees for injury caused by intentional use of registered mark).
171. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir.
1994). The test under Section 32 of the Lanham Act is whether the defendant's use of
the mark in question is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994). Courts look at several factors, which vary slightly among
the different federal circuits, to assess whether there is a likelihood of confusion be-
tween two marks: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the similarity between
the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks; (3) the similarity between the plaintiff's and
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11. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
As already noted, modem technologies have created new ways to
use trademarks, such as the hypothetical college students' use of the
name "Elektrabeat" for their computer bulletin board, which, if not
authorized, can result in infringement. In two recent cases, courts
have held defendants liable for trademark infringement for using
trademarks online without authorization. In Playboy Enterprises v.
Frena, the court found that a bulletin board service's online display of
photographs with Playboy's trademark constituted trademark in-
fringement.172 The court stated that the appearance of the Playboy
name on the screen used in the bulletin board service created the im-
pression that Playboy had authorized the defendant's use of the pho-
tographs, which it had not.173
In Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, the defendants operated a com-
puter bulletin board which allowed users to upload and download un-
authorized copies of Sega video games.174 Whenever someone used a
game copied from the defendants' bulletin board, the first computer
screen display would include the Sega name and logo. 175 The court
found that even if bulletin board users knew that the games had been
downloaded without Sega's permission, people who saw the copied
games after they had entered the stream of commerce inevitably
would be confused into thinking that Sega had authorized the
games.176
A complaint recently filed by the National Football League raises
issues similar to those addressed in Playboy and Sega. This complaint
alleges that two companies have infringed the League's trademarks by
using the trademarks without authorization on a World Wide Web
the defendant's products or services; (4) the identity of purchasers and similarity of
retail outlets; (5) the defendant's intent in using the mark; (6) the degree of care
exercised by purchasers in selecting the product or service (sometimes referred to as
sophistication of the buyers); (7) the length of time the defendant has used the mark
without actual confusion arising; and (8) evidence of actual confusion. See Anheuser,
28 F.3d at 774; Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
Resorts, 830 F. Supp. at 835. No single factor is dispositive. See 3 McCarthy, supra
note 161, § 23.03[1], at 23-44 ("All of these factors are to be considered in reaching a
decision on the likelihood of confusion."). The United States Patent and Trademark
Office looks at a similar group of criteria in deciding whether an applicant's mark is
confusingly similar to a registered mark or a mark that is the subject of another pend-
ing application. See In re E.I. DuPont de DeMours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
172. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1561.
173. Id
174. Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
175. Id. at 684.
176. Id. at 688.
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site 17 7 that provides "football information, entertainment and mer-
chandise" in the course of its services. 178
An issue that has arisen in the context of federal trademark regis-
tration is whether it is possible to obtain federal service mark registra-
tion for the name of a computer bulletin board. In In re Metriplex
Inc., the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board17 9 answered this question
in the affirmative by holding that the electronic transmission of data is
a service entitled to trademark protection. 180 The Metriplex panel also
held that a print-out of a computer screen display which shows the
mark may constitute acceptable evidence of use of the mark in
commerce.18 '
The selection of Internet domain names such as the college stu-
dents' "elektra.com" also has created a new context for trademark dis-
putes. Until recently, InterNIC, 182 the organization responsible for
registering domain names, assigned domain names strictly on a first-
come, first-served basis. 83 For a long time, this did not create any
problems because at least initially, companies were slow to claim do-
main names which mirrored their trademarks and service marks. As
of May 1994, only one-third of Fortune 500 companies had registered
their company names as site names. 1 Furthermore, the names of
177. A World Wide Web site "links servers across the Internet." Symposium First
Amendment and the Media: Regulating Interactive Communications on the Informa-
tion Superhighway: The Changing Landscape of First Amendment Jurisprudence In
Light Of The Technological Advances In Media, 5 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media &
Ent. L.J. 235, 240 n.13 (1995).
178. Complaint at 4, 1 8, National Football League v. Stats, Inc., 95 CIV. 8547
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995). The complaint alleges that the service entitled "Football
Live!" "makes repeated and extensive unauthorized use of registered trademarks be-
longing to the NFL or its member clubs, including every club's team name and the
marks 'National Football League' and 'NFL.'" Id. at 14, 35.
179. An "examining attorney," or "examiner," reviews each federal trademark ap-
plication for procedural and substantive sufficiency. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 161,
§ 19.40[1], at 19-214; Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Trade-
mark Manual of Examining Procedure 1105-1 to 1105-29 (2d ed. 1993). The Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board is the judicial tribunal which hears appeals from the
patent and trademark examiners. 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (1994).
180. In re Metriplex Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315, 1317 (1992).
181. See id. at 1317. Use of a mark is traditionally shown through actual sales of
goods or provision of services. See supra note 167 (discussing nature of use necessary
for exclusive ownership of trademarks).
182. InterNIC, a division of Network Solutions, Inc., manages the offical Internet
name registry with funding from the National Science Foundation. Elizabeth Corco-
ran, Registry Rationing Internet Address, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1994, at C3.
183. Jared Sandberg, Rush to Claim Turf on Internet Ends Tradition of Free 'Do-
main Name', Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1995, at B2.
184. Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, Wired, Oct. 1994, at 50, 50. Mr. Quittner
conducted his own experiment in this context by registering "mcdonalds.com" for
himself. McDonald's Gives in to the Little Guy, Inside Media, Jan. 20, 1995. When
McDonald's discovered the domain name, it demanded that Mr. Quittner surrender
his registration, but Mr. Quittner insisted that the company contribute money to assist
a New York City high school obtain an Internet connection. Id. Eventually McDon-
734 [Vol. 64
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
fourteen percent of the remaining companies had already been regis-
tered by other companies and individuals. 1as
Eventually, however, as an increasing number of companies came
to perceive domain names as valuable assets,1' 6 InterNIC's first-come,
first-served policy generated several trademark disputes. First, the
owners of the MTV cable network ("MTV") filed an action against
former MTV video disc jockey Adam Curry, alleging that Curry's use
of the site name "mtv.com" for his online rock music report consti-
tuted trademark infringement.187 That case settled on confidential
terms, but MTV now controls "mtv.com." 1' 8 Kaplan Educational
Centers ("Kaplan"), the well-known test preparation company, filed a
trademark infringement suit against its competitor Princeton Review
("Princeton"), which had registered "kaplan.com" as its Internet site
name. 8 9 A private arbitration panel ruled that Princeton must relin-
quish all rights in the "kaplan.com" domain name and transfer the
name to Kaplan.' 90
In KnowledgeNe4 Inc. v. Boone, a computer consulting company
called KnowledgeNet brought a federal trademark infringement claim
against not only the individual who had registered "knowl-
edgenet.com" as his domain name, but also against Network Solu-
tions, Inc., which owns InterNIC.19' Similarly, Fry's Electronics, a
computer retailer, charged a small Seattle catering service and In-
terNIC with trademark infringement based on the registration of
"frys.com" as the catering service's domain name.19
ald's agreed to contribute $3600 to the school in exchange for Mr. Quittner's relin-
quishing the domain name. Id.
185. Quittner, supra note 184, at 50.
186. A recent issue of Wired reports that Procter & Gamble ("P&G") has regis-
tered 90 domain names, one for "every conceivable P&G product" and even one for
"every affliction and body part the product is intended to treat," including "head-
achecorn" and "pimples.com." Electric Word, Wired, Nov. 1995, at 49, 55 (emphasis
omitted).
187. MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In a similar
context, the complaint filed by the National Football League alleges that "the domain
address displayed on the computer screen for the [football information] service in-
cludes a reference to 'NFL'." Complaint at 14, 35, National Football League v.
Stats, Inc., 95 CIV. 8547 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10. 1995).
188. InterNIC Domain Name Registry, available in INTERNET, http./I
rs.internic.net.
189. Stewart Ugelow, Address for Success: Internet Name Game, Wash. Post, Aug.
11, 1994, at Al, A20.
190. Jared Sandberg, Washington Post Co. Wins Unit's 'Name' in Trademark Suit,
Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1994, at B8; Peter H. Lewis, A Cyberspace Name Game: Fighting
Words on Internet, N.Y. Tumes, Oct. 6, 1994, at D1, D5.
191. See Parties Try to Settle Internet Trademark Suit, Information Law Alert, May
12, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
192. See Peter H. Lewis, Trademark Holders Win Net Name Battle, San Diego
Union-Tribune, Aug. 22, 1995, at 5.
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InterNIC recently issued a new policy concerning the registration
and handling of disputes concerning domain names.193 Among other
things, the new policy, which was revised effective November 23,
1995,194 requires each domain name applicant to make a number of
warranties and representations, including a warranty and representa-
tion to the effect that its use of the proposed domain name "does not
interfere with or infringe the right of any third party in any jurisdic-
tion with respect to trademark, service mark, tradename, company
name or any other intellectual property right."'195 The policy also re-
quires each applicant to indemnify InterNIC and various related orga-
nizations against any loss arising from trademark or other claims that
may be lodged against InterNIC as a result of the applicant's use of its
domain name.19
6
Under the policy, if a third party obtains a court order to the effect
that a particular domain name "rightfully belongs" to that third party,
InterNIC will terminate the applicant's"9 registration and withdraw
the domain name from use on the Internet. 9 " If a third party presents
evidence to InterNIC demonstrating that an applicant's use of a do-
main name "violates the [third party's] rights,"'19 9 but the applicant
first used its domain name2"' before the third party first used its
193. NSI Domain Name Dispute Policy Statement, available in INTERNET, URL:
ftp://rs.intemic.net/policy/internic/internic-domain-4.txt [hereinafter Dispute Policy
Statement]. It is reasonable to assume that InterNIC changed its policy in response to
being named in the KnowledgeNet and Fry's Electronics actions. See supra notes 191-
92 and accompanying text.
194. Dispute Policy Statement, supra note 193. The original version of the policy
was entitled "NSI Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Statement," but the Dis-
pute Policy Statement explains that InterNIC's revised "policy name does not include
the word '[r]esolution,' as the policy relates to Domain Name disputes, not the resolu-
tion of them." Id.
195. See id. 1(c). The other warranties and representations include the following:
(1) "Applicant has a bona fide intention to use the Domain Name on a regular basis
on the Internet," id. 1(b); and (2) "Applicant is not seeking to use the Domain
Name for any unlawful purpose, including, without limitation, tortious interference
with contract or prospective business advantage, unfair competition, injuring the rep-
utation of another, or for the purpose of confusing, misleading a person, whether
natural or incorporated." Id. I 1(d). Each applicant also must meet certain technical
requirements, namely, having "operational name service from at least two operational
Internet servers for that domain name." IL 3.
196. Id. 4.
197. The Dispute Policy Statement uses only the term "applicant," not "registrant,"
but the complete text makes clear that the term "applicant" includes anyone who has
registered a domain name. See id. 5.
198. Id. 1 5. A binding arbitration award would have the same weight. Id.
199. Id. I 6(b). "Such evidence includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the
Domain Name is identical to a valid and subsisting foreign or United States federal
registration of a trademark or service mark that is in full force and effect .... ." Id.
"Trademark or service mark registrations from the individual states.., of the United
States are not sufficient." Id.
200. The date of "first use" for this purpose would be the "activation date" of the
applicant's domain name. Id I 6(c)(1).
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mark2 ' or obtained federal registration, the applicant may elect to
continue to use the disputed name as its domain name unless and until
the third party's claims are resolved by court order or arbitration.20
In this situation, however, the applicant must give additional indemni-
ties to InterNIC and post a bond." 3 If the applicant declines to post
the bond, InterNIC may place the disputed name on "hold. ''"2 1 If the
applicant did not use its domain name before the third party first used
its mark, but the applicant has a certificate of trademark or service
mark registration,20 5 the applicant finds itself in the same situation 06
If the applicant did not use its domain name before the third party
first used its mark and cannot produce a registration, the applicant
must agree to temporary reassignment of its domain namey0 7 One
clear implication of this new policy is that anyone with a registered
domain name should register their domain name as a service mark,2 s
so that in the event of a third party challenge, the domain name owner
will be able to produce the evidence necessary to keep its domain
name from being put on "hold." 2°9
201. There is no indication of what evidence would be sufficient to establish that
the third party did in fact did use its mark before the activation date of the applicant's
domain name.
202. 1& 1 6(c)(2).
203. I I 6(c)(5). The bond must be for "an amount sufficient to meet the damage
sought, or if no specific amount of damages is sought, in an amount deemed reason-
able in [Network Solutions, Inc.'s ("NSr')] sole discretion within fourteen... days of
NSI's request." Id
204. Id
205. The only registrations which the InterNIC will consider for this purpose are
foreign and United States federal registrations. Id. I 6(b). The applicant must submit
a certified copy of the registration on which it seeks to rely. See id. 'I 6(c)(1).
206. Id 6(c)(2).
207. Id. I 6(c)(3). In this situation, InterNIC will place the domain name on "hold"
after a 90-day transition period to a new domain name. Id InterNIC will "assist [the]
[a]pplicant with assignment of a new [d]omain [njame" if the applicant submits a writ-
ten request for such assistance within 30 days of InterNIC's request for trademark or
service mark registration. Id If the applicant refuses reassignment of and will not
relinquish the domain name, InterNIC will immediately place the name on "hold." Id
I 6(c)(4). In either case, InterNIC will reinstate the domain name upon the order of a
court or arbitration panel. Id. I 6(c)(6).
208. Even before InterNIC issued this new policy, some companies were applying
to register domain names as trademarks. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., for ex-
ample, applied to register GLAMOUR.COM, MADEMOISELLE.COM and
PARADE.COM for online magazine services in late 1994. Official Gazette of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Sept. 26, 1995, at TM 360, TM 362. Fol-
lowing its dispute with Joshua Quittner, see supra note 184, McDonald's applied to
register MCDONALDS.COM in February 1995. Official Gazette of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, Oct. 10, 1995, at TM 375.
209. As previously noted, even the possession of a certificate of registration will not
excuse the applicant of a disputed domain name from having to indemnify nterNIC,
see supra note 196 and accompanying text, but it could prove helpful in resolving the
challenging party's claims.
1995]
